May 202012
 

I’ve been enjoying listening to a reading of Murray Rothbart’s Economic Thought Before Adam Smith. I’m even finding the slow monotone of the the reader quite a pleasure. Rothbart is a contemporary adherent of the Austrian School of Economics; this book examines the development of economic thought in the context of philosophy, theology, and history from the Greeks down to Adam Smith (I’m about halfway, in the 13th to 16th centuries.)

The Austrian school proper was founded by Carl Menger, with Principles of Economics, published in 1871. His work resurrected the Scholastic-French approach to economics, an approach which can be traced back to fifteenth century Scholastic followers of St. Thomas Aquinas at the University of Salamanca in Spain.From these Scholastics came the recognition of the existence of economic law and many of the basic features of economic activity, including supply and demand, inflation, and the subjective nature of economic value. They were (relatively) pro-market, in favor on individual economic freedom to trade and make contracts and opposed to taxes, price controls, and regulations which inhibited enterprise.1

There have been a few particular ideas which stand out in the course so far. Rothbart compares his Austrian school views on economy with those in the tradition of Adam Smith by noting that the school of economic thought he follows originated and established itself in Catholic countries. In Catholicism, he maintains, consumption is the goal of production, and consumer utility and enjoyment in moderation are valuable, all of which leads to a subjective utility theory of economics, that the value of an item is determined by its value to an individual consumer. Adam Smith, on the other hand, from a Calvinist country, with its stern emphasis that hard work is a great good in itself and consumer enjoyment merely a necessary evil, proposed the labor theory of value, wherein the value of an object is tied up in the amount of labor that went into its production. This insight into how the religious traditions can influence economic thought in fundamental ways, is quite engaging, and more so when we imagine applying it to other areas of thought.

Rothbart makes a second interesting point when he contrasts Scholasticism with Calvinism in the way they view God, and in the consequences of those views. For Scholastics, God can be approached and apprehended by all of man’s faculties, not only faith, but also reason and the senses. There is a natural law which governs our world, which can be discovered by reason and which we can use to guide our actions. Calvin, on the under hand, saw man as too depraved to have reason capable of approaching God in this same way. God was outside of man’s faculties; for men, then, God is unknowable and seemingly arbitrary. Nor can reason apprehend natural law, and this diminishes its value. Rothbart mentions a few consequences of this. Calvinists, unable to use reason to guide their lives, either had to rely on instructions, which they found in a strict adherence to the Bible; or had to rely on revelation. Rothbart details some of the almost humorous, if tragic, consequences which followed the revelations of certain individuals and their adherents. A second consequence is that the early Calvinists (and Lutherans) supported the absolutism of the state and the mingling of state and religion.

Rothbart also makes what I thought was a rather provocative critique of the scientific method. After decrying the split between reason and empiricism in later European thought, with Descartes and the continental rationalists practicing reason divorced from empiricism; and English empiricists concentrating on empirical facts without applying reason; Rothbart maintains that modern scientific method is hobbled by emphasizing empiricism without man’s reasoning faculties. I wonder what more a scientific method informed by reason might accomplish.

My understanding of Austrian (and classical, Adam Smithian) economics is thin, but I suspect that my political leanings lean away from the direction of the Austrian school. Nonetheless, Rothbart uses reason to interpret facts about economics, bringing in history, theology, and politics to bear on the investigation in a manner much as I hope to do in examining and thinking about the political mind.

1 What is Austrian Economics?

Also, Austrian School of Economics, Austrian School of Economics, Austrian School, and The Austrian School of Economics

May 142012
 

Adam Smith describes society, both economic and social/moral, as developing from webs of human interactions. We build our societies from the bottom up by virtue of our unscripted person-to-person interactions. Natural law, on the other hand, defines society in a more top-down fashion. Society does, and should, follow the dictates of a natural law which stands outside of the members of the society.

Richard Thaler, in Slippery-Slope Logic, Applied to Health Care, in Sunday’s New York Times, lambastes slippery-slope logic in general, and how it was applied to the health care debate in particular by the justices of the Supreme Court. Referring to Justice Scalia’s remark that, “Therefore, you can make people buy broccoli,” Thaler notes, “The irony is that Justices Roberts and Scalia are warning of a risk that they and their colleagues have the power to prevent.”

My guess is that just as the natural law is regarded as an outside force that does and should guide how we construct our society, so frequent citation of the slippery slope in argumentation is based on a sense that there is an outside force which does and will govern how our lives unfold. Thaler’s reference to the power of the justices to guide society is a counterbalance to that. We, the citizens of the society, in our myriad interactions with each other, form our society and guide our lives.

This notion of a slippery slope which Thaler rejects fits in well with my previous attempts at a taxonomy of the political mind. As we go about designing and directing our society, who’s advice do we take, that of the wise persons who have gone on before us and whose wisdom has stood the test of time; or ourselves and our neighbors, who are in the midst of this life and society, and should best know its features and our desires?

Congress will not pass a law which requires the eating of broccoli; and if they did, in the reverse of Prohibition, people would refuse to eat it anyway. Maybe that’s the natural law; or maybe it’s just that humans have some sense, and some ability to regulate themselves.

May 022012
 

As I get to the end of Patrick Allitt’s lectures on The Conservative Tradition, he summarizes the different strands of conservatism. While our political discussion these days seems to take place in a two-dimensional world, more or less conservative, more or less liberal, I’m struck at the three dimensional world of conservatism that Professor Allitt lays out.

As a prologue, perhaps, Professor Allitt returns to the notion that conservatives believe in stability, and gradual change, a notion which traces its roots back to Edmund Burke. But Corey Robin, The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin, emphasizes the revolutionary spirit at the core of conservatism, as in the Reagan Revolution. The main difference between these two forces, one quiet, the other forceful, depends on whether conservatives feel they are in power and in control of their society. In Burke’s time, conservatives were in power, and his notion was to conserve; Reaganites, by contrast, and today’s Tea Partiers, sense a society out of their control, and want to take the nation back in a way that requires a bit of the revolutionary spirit.

Professor Allitt, a historian analyzing people and events empirically, categorizes conservatives into Paleoconservatives (Traditionalists), Neoconservatives, Theoconservatives, and Libertarians. They do not all get along! But it is the several poles that make conservatism three dimensional.

One pole is has the modesty of the Traditionalists at one end and the vigor of the Neoconservatives at the other. The Traditionalists want small, modest government; the Neoconservatives a government strong enough to project itself in the world. The concern of the Traditionalists is that a government forceful in foreign affairs will be so large and complex that it can’t help but be forceful in domestic affairs, as well.

But the Traditionalists and the Neoconservatives tend to share in a strong sense of group identity; for the Neoconservatives it is a more abstract notion of an America that needs to wield its power in foreign affairs in order to protect itself from its enemies, and extend its influence into the world. Traditionalists tend to see a relatively homogeneous society which must be kept so. This leads to opposition to immigration, and opposition to a secularism which believes in diversity. The other end of this pole might be the Libertarians, focusing on the freedom of individuals rather than the cohesiveness of the group.

Another, related pole has virtue at one end and individual liberty at the other. The Traditionalists, and particularly its religious conservative strand, believe that virtue should be the guiding principle of society, a virtue which should be enforced. The Libertarians believe very strongly in the other end of the pole, individual liberty. Another perspective on this pole has on one end a belief in hierarchy and some disdain for egalitarianism; the other end of the pole is, again, a strong sense of individual liberty and a government and society which do not intrude into individual’s lives.

The notion of virtue itself creates another pole, evident even in recent conservative thought. Many traditionalists have been historically and continue today to be repulsed by modernism and commercial society, retreating into an appreciation of agrarian society, or at least small-town society. The other end of this pole sees virtue in economic liberty, in rugged capitalism, and its heroes in capitalists, though often personified in small businesspersons.

This three-dimensionality of conservatism lends a richness to it, if at the cost of some clutter. As this investigation continues and we view conservatism from different perspectives, historical, psychological, evolutionary, it will be necessary to keep this diversity in mind.

Apr 292012
 

Floyd Norris’ article in Friday’s New York Times, In Europe, a Marriage Shows Signs of Fraying, quotes Jens Weidman, president of the Bundesbank. “A widespread lack of trust in public finances weighs heavily on growth,” he said. “There is uncertainty regarding potential future tax increases, while funding costs are rising for private and public creditors alike.” In those circumstances, continued austerity “might inspire confidence and actually help the economy to grow.” Andrew Mellon, Herbert Hoover’s Treasury secretary, could not have said it better.

Paul Krugman has called it the confidence fairy, and follows up in his Friday column, Death of a Fairy Tale. As Professor Krugman puts it, “the idea was that the confidence fairy would come in and reward policy makers for their fiscal virtue.”

I have referenced, in earlier posts, Jonathan Haidt’s What the Tea Partiers Really Want. In it he concludes that what conservatives such as Tea Partiers have is a moral passion, and what they want is not liberty, but karma. Defining karma simplistically, if you do the right thing, you should receive good fortune; do the wrong thing, and you should suffer.

If, as several commentators have noted, we tend to project our sense of how the family should manage onto the government and the world at large, we would believe that just as it is a moral good to manage our family’s finances to keep us out of debt, it is a moral good for governments to avoid debt as much as possible. There should be karma in this; if governments make the proper moral choice to avoid debt, good fortune should follow.

In the near term, as Professor Krugman notes, this has not worked out. Austerity seems to be leading to a debt spiral as economies shrink and see their debt loads increase. Maybe karma requires patience, and in the long-term, austerity will result in more stable economies. Or maybe our sense of karma is misplaced when it comes to global economics, maybe there is no confidence fairy, and maybe we’ll find out before it’s too late.

Apr 252012
 

Today’s lecture from Patrick Allitt’s course on The Conservative Tradition included information on Richard Weaver, a conservative American writer in the 1940′s and 1950′s. Weaver believed that western thought went wrong with William of Occam’s nominalism. In realism, or what we might call idealism, taking the common example of the chair, there is an ideal of a chair that physical chairs partake of. Nominalism, on the other hand, holds that there are real items that we sit on, and we create the word chair to describe these items. Plato was an idealist; philosophy is a striving to understand the ideals which underly the world of senses. (Aristotle, on the other hand, while not a nominalist, was an empiricist, believing that knowledge is gained by studying the world around you.)

Nominalism, in Weaver’s view, leads to relativism, to each man becoming his own priest, and to moral degradation. He rejected the dehumanization that is brought by materialism, science, and technology. There must be a center, a transcendant truth around which people can structure their beliefs and their lives. If there is no transcendant center, then we are just making it all up out of thin air, and what would be the point.

Professor Allitt notes that the concept of natural law underlies much of conservative thought. Natural law comes from nature, is universal, and can be discovered by reason. This gives it a standing which is outside of human invention; it is truth. When we are in accord with natural law, we are in accord with a truth beyond ourselves.

Much of today’s political commentary sounds as if the commentators are speaking from a foundation of natural law, that is, they have discovered the truth, and they can use that to defend or rebuff ideas and information. This certainly applies to our discourse on economic subjects, and is evident in the use of terms like liberty and fairness. But it also applies even to things we would think of as empirical, or scientific; evolution and climate change being two examples.

While I am a religious person, and do have some sense of grounding in natural law, I think of myself much more as an empiricist. I do believe that we can take a moral approach to subjects like economics; but before we bandy about terms like liberty or fairness, we need to investigate the real world and come to some conclusion about which policies lead to prosperity, since that is what economics is about, in the end. We do not want a “fair” economic system if it makes everyone poor; nor do we want to prioritize economic “liberty”, if it leads to economic desolation.

Approaching scientific subjects with this same a priori sense of truth seems discordant, since science is empirical by its nature. If we have evidence that the economic policy we espouse leads to prosperity, we can apply our moral values of liberty, or fairness, to persuade others to support our policies. While it is certainly proper to challenge the veracity of scientific findings, it seems incoherent to challenge them on the basis of a sense of right and wrong.

As we continue these investigations, it will be interesting to see how closely these notions of nominalism and idealism, empiricism and natural law, play out in our understanding of the conservative and liberal mind.

Apr 212012
 

Adam Smith wrote two books. In one, the Theory of Moral Sentiments, he discusses the need and ability of individuals in society to be sympathetic to others. In the other, The Wealth of Nations, he discusses how self-interest benefits society. Some have seen a contradiction in these two outlooks.  James Otteson titles his work on Adam Smith the “Marketplace of Life“. The idea of a marketplace when discussing economic theory such as in the Wealth of Nations is obvious. But we also create our society by “free-market” interactions amongst ourselves. Rather than being formed by a set of rules imposed from the top, society is created and grows as the individual interactions among its members.

David Brooks, in Testing the Teachers (19 Apr 2012), argues for “value-added assessments” for colleges so that we can measure their effectiveness. He mentions with praise those colleges which have put together assessment strategies, and refrains from recommending a coercive approach.

Diane Senechal takes Brooks to task for his suggestion. She delineates the numbers of ways in which students may be doing the “right” thing and yet not be improving vis-a-vis some objective standard of measurement. And David Brooks mentions the fear of an accountability model on the nature of No Child Left Behind.

We have followed, among the modes of conservatism, the weak-government, free-market strand, and a strand which believes in enforcing a particular set of morals on society (think Christian conservatives). We can see elements of these two strands in the reactions to objective assessments of education. The free-market strand would insist on a rather extensive level of localization of education, either K-12, run by local school boards, or colleges, each run individually. The moral strand would insist upon setting an agenda for the improvement of society, having schools organize around this agenda, then offering some sort of assessment to make sure the schools are fulfilling their mission. (The moral strand of liberalism is in close agreement on the approach, if not the agenda.)

David Brooks, though, suggests a “free-market” approach to assessment, as well. Just as individuals pursue their own interests in Adam Smith’s society, and interact with sympathy with their neighbors, so colleges will develop individual approaches to assessment, and share amongst themselves. He invites foundations, academic conferences, and magazines to weigh in with suggestions for assessment. Colleges can not only design or choose their own assessment strategy, but when marketing themselves to prospective students, can emphasize a uniqueness based not only on the college experience, but on the ways in which that college experience has been assessed, how valid those assessments are, and how relevant they are to the interests of prospective students.

 

Apr 142012
 

As I continue listening to the lecture series The Conservative Tradition1 by Professor Allitt, I’m struck by the varieties of political belief as history has unfolded, which he considers conservative. In the previous post, I mentioned Professor Allitt’s distinction of state’s rights conservatives, who believe in small, decentralized government, and stability, or security, or strong government conservatives, who believe that a strong government is necessary to preserve security. In subsequent lectures, he has mentioned the agrarian, virtue conservatives both in Britain and America who believe that life on the land enhances virtue. Thomas Jefferson is an example, who waxed rhapsodic on the virtues of the yeoman and the agrarian life. These conservatives resisted the commercialization of society that was coming with the Industrial Revolution. At the same time, Alexander Hamilton, promoting a strong government and support for commerce, is also a conservative; likewise Adam Smith. Professor Allitt describes the Civil War as being fought by two camps of conservatives, the Southerners who emphasized the land and virtue, specifically the importance of honor; and the Northerners, who emphasized preserving the union, because what could be more politically conservative than that. Abraham Lincoln is described as a conservative for his beliefs and efforts in preserving the nation. Further, through his speeches, Lincoln made belief in democracy a traditional, and thus a conservative value, whereas previously other conservatives, for example Edmund Burke, were distrustful of democracy and equality and held that a trained ruling class was needed for good governing.

As I was considering the varieties of conservatism, I came across and read with interest the article Are religious Americans always conservative?2The author, Dr. Ariel Malka, explores the connection between religiosity and political conservatism, and concludes that the connection between the two is not very strong. The interesting point he makes is that those who are religious and are politically-engaged tend to be politically conservative, but that those who are religious but not that interested in politics are no more likely to hold politically conservative views than the non-religious on many political issues. He lists gun control, racial policy, and the death penalty as examples. It has been noted that we choose our group, then adopt that group’s beliefs; Dr. Malka’s studies seem to reinforce that view. As he notes, “Exposure to messages that point to a bond between religiosity and conservatism seems to be necessary to translate one’s religiosity into conservative positions on most issues.”

There are several points of interest in Professor Allitt’s and Dr. Malka’s insights into the varieties of conservatism. Views on particular issues which might define conservative belief vary by time and place. Issues which might define conservatism in America don’t necessarily define it in Britain; issues which might have defined conservatism in the past don’t define it in the present. Beyond issues, even what passes for a conservative outlook varies; in some outlooks, conservatism is about preserving and instilling virtue, in others it is about individual rights, or economic freedom, and the two outlooks do not necessarily lead to a similar set of beliefs on political issues. Dr. Malka makes the point that, “Perhaps there is no enduring feature of human psychological makeup that favors a link between religiosity and political conservatism.” Extending this notion means that it may be difficult to find an enduring feature of human psychological makeup that favors conservative or liberal belief. Since the point of my investigations in The Political Mind is precisely to identify what makes an individual hold conservative or liberal beliefs, based on history, psychology, and anthropology, the investigation, it seems, just got harder.

1 Conservative Tradition
2 Are religious Americans always conservative?

Apr 082012
 

Having finished Thomas Pangle’s course on the Constitution1, I started Patrick N. Allitt’s course on The Conservative Tradition2. In an early lecture, he mentions the conservatism of the federalists, and several conservative features in the Constitution.

When thinking about Professor Pangle’s course, I associated the Anti-Federalists with populist conservatives today (I would include Tea Party conservatism as an example of populist conservatism); by contrast, I made an association of Federalists writing in favor of a stronger central government with a more liberal wing of thought, at least in today’s terms.

Professor Allitt, however, thinks the Federalists are conservatives, that stable government is conservative and those parts of the Federalist argument and of the Constitution which promote stability are also conservative. He consider the fact that the Senate was not popularly elected to be a conservative element; he also thinks that elements which seek to reign in the tyranny of the majority are also conservative.

David Brooks, in his book the The Social Animal, makes the point that the adult personality is defined in opposition to one’s natural enemies in high school. When choosing our political beliefs, we think about what that group in high school we didn’t like probably thinks, and then decide to think the opposite. Professor Allitt makes the point that certain political beliefs considered fundamental to conservatives in America are not at all so in Britain, and vice-versa. Chris Mooney writes, in The Republican Brain, that innate temperamental differences between the brains of conservatives and liberals cause their different political views; Kevin Drum, in a response in Mother Jones3, takes issue with that. Noting that in America the two issues which most strongly divide liberals and conservatives are climate change and evolution, Drum points out that conservative Catholics don’t deny evolution, and that mainstream European conservatives don’t deny climate science. To a large degree, we choose our group, and then adopt their beliefs; or in David Brooks’ telling, we choose the group we oppose, then adopt beliefs that are in opposition to those that group holds.

We have mentioned populist conservatism and what might be called “stability” conservatism. There are certainly other variations of conservative and liberal thought, often likely without clear boundaries between them. Delineating a taxonomy of conservative and liberal beliefs will require gathering details from scientific studies on how conservative and liberal brains differ; from psychological studies on how we form groups and beliefs; and from history and current events to capture the variety of conservative and liberal beliefs and understand how our political beliefs evolve. I hope to return to this topic many times.

1 Great Debate: Advocates and Opponents of the American Constitution
2 Conservative Tradition
3 Are Republicans Really Anti-Science?

Mar 312012
 

In the context of having just finished Thomas Pangle’s course on the Constitution, two columns in the New York Times caught my attention. One, Broccoli Mandates and the Commerce Clause from James B. Steward in Business Day, commenting on the commerce clause and recent argument regarding the health care reform issue in the Supreme Court, ends, “The commerce clause was a response to the chaotic and often conflicting state regulations that hobbled the nation under the Articles of Confederation.” The second, Pragmatism on the Prairie by Gretchen Dykstra, describes Republican, conservative, North Dakota’s venture into socialism and their continuing support of it.

The Anti-Federalist image of society, it seems, and not much unlike the image which today’s Tea Party reflects, is of an idyllic, small republic of like-minded citizens participating rather directly in governing themselves. It is a society which 1780′s Anti-Federalists could well imagine, and colored their antipathy toward strengthening the federal government. However, as James Steward notes, even in the days of the Constitutional Convention, with a nation suffering from a lack of cohesion created by the decentralizing Articles of Confederation, this idyllic republic was no longer sustainable.

Except, perhaps, in North Dakota, a state, which, after a population explosion, still has a small population of about 684,000 individuals, quite homogeneous ethnically and religiously (90% white, 80% of German or Scandinavian origin, 86% Christian), and economically (agriculture and food-processing are a large part of the economy, with energy playing an increasing role).

Gretchen Dykstra notes that North Dakota is the only state in the union with a state-owned bank; it also has a profitable state-owned grain elevator and flour mill. All state revenues are deposited in the Bank of North Dakota, and from this it supports programs like student loans, loans for new farmers, and for commercial and industrial enterprises. The grain elevator and mill compete with private grain elevators, and returns its annual profit to the North Dakota general fund. In addition, the state maintains the toughest laws in the country limiting corporate farming.

Ms. Dykstra asks the question, how does the Republican, conservative citizenry support such obvious socialism? She goes on to describe the difficult circumstances in the years 1915-1920, which led to the creation of some of these institution, and their relative success since then.

I think the key understanding is that conservatives are not really about “small” government per se, nor necessarily about all of the other issues which inform our current political debate. Rather, they want a government which supports them. But if the idyllic, small republic of like-minded citizens was already past in the 1780′s when the Articles of Confederation gave way to a more-centralizing Constitution, perhaps it still lives on successfully in places like North Dakota.

Mar 272012
 

I have just finished the last of 12 lectures in Thomas Pangle’s course on the Constitution. There are a couple of points that I find particularly interesting, one regarding the independence of the judiciary, the other the Federalist reluctance to have a Bill of Rights.

In listening to Professor Pangle on the Federalists’ interest in an independent judiciary, I couldn’t help but hear echoes of the difference between fundamentalist Christianity and Catholicism. For fundamentalist Christians, the Bible is not only the true and literal word of God, but the whole of all that is needed to live one’s life. Catholics, on the other hand, not only believe in the wisdom of tradition handed down, but in the power of humans, the Magistrate, guided by the Holy Spirit, to pronounce on belief and the life of its followers.

The Federalists favored an independent judiciary, made up of especially learned and wise individuals, who could pronounce on the life of the nation based not only on the Constitution, but on their personal wisdom. This sounds much like Catholicism. Today’s federalists, on the other hand, take as their judicial philosophy strict constructionism, which much like fundamentalist Christianity’s take on the Bible, believe not only that they must follow the literal word of the Constitution, but that the words there are all that is necessary to guide the nation.

The second item of interest is the Federalist reluctance to include a Bill of Rights. Though this has many facets, the one I find interesting is the notion that if we enumerate the rights which the people have, then we will limit their rights to just those things which have been enumerated. This, too, has that same air of strict constructionism, and we hear arguments made for and against laws and opinions based on whether or not we can make a clear connection with some explicit section of the Constitution. It seems, from Professor Pangle’s explication of the Federalist reluctance to have a Bill of Rights, that they intended for the universe of rights which the people have to be broader than what could be enumerated. This dovetails nicely with the belief in an independent judiciary which could apply learning and wisdom beyond the mere words of the Constitution to the life of the nation.

When presented with differences of opinion as between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, or between the living document’ists and the strict constructionists, I think that the fundamental question that they are trying to answer, and end up answering differently, is: Who do we trust when it comes to running our lives? Do we let the past tell us how to lead our lives in the present, since what has been handed down to us has passed the test of time; or do we think that in the end we have only ourselves to rely on, so we may as well trust ourselves to decide how to lead our lives.